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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The extent of government deficits and debt has been one of the most debated 
issues in economics in recent years. High and volatile fiscal deficits may be harmful to 
welfare, for instance, debt-to-GDP ratio is negatively related with the long run fiscal 
sustainability, therefore, affecting the living standards of future generation [Alesina and 
Perotti (1996); Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994)]. High and 
volatile deficit may also increase the level and volatility of inflation since central bank is 
deficient in independence [Fata and Mihov (2010)]. Many academics have tried to 
understand the determinants of the large public deficits, but unfortunately the literature 
on fiscal deficit volatility is rare.  
Budget deficits were initially considered to be a merely macroeconomic 
phenomenon, but starting from the 1980s due to emergence of political economics, 
researchers have considered this issue from both economic and political perspectives. 
Further, the fact that many industrialised countries had been facing considerable budget 
deficits following the first oil crisis in 1973 and these deficits increased persistently over 
the following decades of high growth whereas the economic theory suggests these 
deficits should reduce during more prosperous times. As a consequence, the debt levels 
have been increasing steadily over the same period, and interestingly the deficits and debt 
level varies in size among various countries even facing similar economic shocks. In 
order to explain the cross-country differences for deficits and debt levels, the existing 
normative economic theory alone may not be considered sufficient. Therefore, political 
variables, such as the political stability, law and order, and institutional factors, like 
democracy, are included as an additional explanatory variable in models that have tried to 
give a positive explanation for the observed patterns in deficits [Woo (2003); Fatas and 
Mihov (2010)]. 
In addition to the persistently increasing budget defects its volatility is also a major 
challenge for many developed and developing countries for several reasons. First, due to 
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high deficit volatility, it is not possible to predict the timing and magnitude of fiscal 
policies and this generates inefficiency of economic decision-making. Second, the fiscal 
deficit volatility may also cause the government spending volatility and the distortions 
created by temporary or infrequent measures to meet these fluctuations in spending. 
When government spending volatility depends on fiscal deficit volatility, the quality and 
efficiency of the government services: health or education may also be reduced. Third, 
high fiscal deficit volatility may divert investment towards short term investment projects 
and leads to irreversible human capital losses. High deficit volatility may lead to high 
volatility of interest rates which represents a financial burden for investments. The 
pursuit for models explaining budget deficits from a positive viewpoint has considerably 
achieved attention over the last three decades; however, the search for models for budget 
deficit volatility is slightly new issue. 
The major focus of the present study is to empirically investigate the sources of 
fiscal deficit volatility for South Asian and ASEAN countries for the period 1984 to 
2010. The study adds to existing literature by examining the economic political and 
institutional factors that causes instability in budget deficits. The persistence in budget 
deficit volatility is captured by lag budget deficit volatility in the model. The study 
highlights the effect of increased openness and high inflation on budget deficit 
volatility analysis. The analysis include the quantitative and qualitative role of political 
instability on the budget deficit instability in general, the role of institutions: 
democracy and some governance variables: corruption, law and order and conflicts in 
particular. The sample of the countries include four major South Asian countries: 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka and five major ASEAN countries: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Philippines as these countries have common 
characteristics of large and persistent as well as instable budget deficit. 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical 
literature on this area. In Section 3 the overview of the fiscal deficit in these two regions 
is discussed briefly. The methodology and data is presented in Section 4. The empirical 
results are discussed in Section 4 and last section concludes the study. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A common feature of fiscal behaviour in the majority of developed and developing 
countries over the last thirty years is the persistence rise of fiscal deficits. In addition to 
the damages of high fiscal deficit, its volatility is also a major challenge for many 
countries. The issue of budget deficit and its determinants is extensively empirically 
examined; however, the instability of budget deficit is not seriously investigated. This 
section reviews some of the relevant literature in this area. 
The literature on this issue can be categorised according to the various politically 
oriented variables as e.g., political stability, size of government, fragmentation of 
government vs. institutional factors, type of budgetary procedures, negotiation power of 
unions etc. The definition of particular explanatory variables has received considerable 
attention [Roubini and Sachs (1989) and De Haan and Sturm (1994)]. The equilibrium 
model proposed by Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) argues that in order to 
minimise distortions, tax rates should be relatively constant over time and therefore 
spending and revenue shocks should be smoothed by budget deficits and surpluses. 
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However, tax-smoothing’ model does not explain why there is rise and persistence of the 
budget deficits that emerged following the oil crises in the 1970s, and neither why 
countries facing similar economic shocks experienced varying levels of fiscal deficits. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996b) argue that economic theory alone cannot explain this 
issue; one should therefore try to resolve in the perspective of political and institutional 
aspects of the question. In this framework, Person (2001) and Person and Tabellin (2001) 
find that political and institutional variables also matter for fiscal responsiveness. 
Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) and Sorensen, et al. (2001) argue that fiscal policy is less 
anti-cyclical in election years. Lane (2003) shows that countries with volatile output and 
dispersed political power are the most likely to run pro-cyclical policies. Fatas and Mihov 
(2003, 2006) find that strict budgetary constraints lead to lower policy volatility and 
reduce the responsiveness of fiscal policy to output shocks. Alesina and Tabellini (2008) 
suggest that most of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries can be 
explained by high levels of corruption. Afonso, et al. (2008) show that while country and 
government sizes and income have negative effects on the discretionary component of 
fiscal policy, they tend to increase fiscal policy persistence. 
As regards institutions, Persson and Tabellini (1999) find that majoritarian 
elections lead to more redistribution and larger governments and that presidential regimes 
lead to less redistribution and smaller governments. Under presidential systems the 
government is more transparent and independent centralised authority [Shugart and Carey 
(1992)]. Hence, economic policy can be formulated and implemented without much 
delay or interference. The opposite may be true of the parliamentary system, depending 
on the electoral laws and their degree of proportionality. Therefore, fiscal outcomes may 
be different across regimes (presidential versus parliamentary) and electoral systems 
(proportional versus majoritarian). Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1997) find that large deficits and debts have been more common in countries with 
proportional rather than majoritarian and presidential electoral systems. In countries with 
coalition governments and frequent government turnovers, and in countries with lenient 
rather than strict budget processes. Henisz (2004) suggests that the presence of 
institutional checks and balances may improve economic outcomes. Woo (2003) 
emphasises the role of political factors (government fragmentation, political instability 
and institutions), social polarisation (ethnic division and income inequality), and 
institutional factors (budgetary procedures and rules, bureaucratic, efficiency, and 
democracy). Leachman, et al. (2007) show that fiscal performance is better when fiscal 
budgeting institutions are strong. 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between income inequality and fiscal 
deficit is limited. Woo (1999) provides the first econometric evidence that income 
inequality is a significant determinant of public deficits. Alesina and Perotti (1996a) find 
evidence that income inequality increases political instability. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1994) suggest that there may be a tendency of the majority to 
vote for large redistributive spending in a democratic country with an unequal income 
distribution. Woo (1999) develops a model of fiscal deficits in which the polarisation of 
preferences play a decisive role. In a highly polarised society, policy-makers face greater 
incentives to maintain higher spending for their preferred sectors, leading to larger 
deficits.  
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Roubini and Sachs (1989a, 1989b) focus on the relationship between deficits and 
the structure of the governments (fragmentation) and conclude that the deficits do tend to 
be positively associated with the fragmentation. Edin and Ohlsson (1994) reveal that the 
former conclusion may be due to the definition and dimension of the variable, capturing 
government fragmentation, claiming that only minority governments have a particular 
tendency to develop large deficits, and differences between majority governments with 
different numbers of participating parties are insignificant. De Haan and Sturm (1994) 
find support for neither of the two hypotheses; conclude that there are no significant 
differences in explanatory power among single party, majority governments, coalition 
governments and minority governments. Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999) argue that minority governments are associated with larger deficits. 
Minority governments attributes lack of coordination because there are more participants 
in the decision-making process. A deficit can arise in this situation because individual 
policy-makers fail to internalise the full cost of their own spending financed through 
common tax revenues. 
The political business cycles approaches and the partisans theories indicate how 
politicians influence macroeconomic outcomes. One implication of the political business 
cycle theories [Nordhaus (1975); Rogoff and Sibert (1988); Rogoff (1990), among 
others] is that all politicians will implement the same expansionary economic policy 
before elections. The theories of political business cycles can be distinguished in models 
assuming adaptive [Nordhaus (1975)] and rational expectations [Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988); Rogoff (1990)]. In the traditional approaches with adaptive expectations, 
opportunistic policy-makers can take advantage of a Phillips curve trade-off. 
Opportunistic policymakers can fool naive voters and stimulate the economy immediately 
before each election. Alt and Lassen (2006) point out that the greater is the transparency 
of the political process, the lower is the probability that politicians behave 
opportunistically. Partisan models emphasise policy-makers’ ideological motivations and 
argue that right-and left-wing parties follow different policies. Perotti and Kontopoulo 
(2002) show that ideology only influences the budget process via expenditures and finds 
no significant evidence that it leads to differences in surpluses or deficits. Volkerink and 
De Haan (2001) use an ideology index and find similar results. Mulas-Granados (2003) 
finds that left wing governments are not directly associated with higher or lower deficits. 
In more recent literature, different definitions of the degree of fragmentation are 
considered e.g. Volkerink and De Haan (2001) find that the number of spending ministers 
has stronger and more robust explanatory power than the number of parties in the 
government. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find supportive results and show that the 
latter variable even turns insignificant. Franzese (2002) has distinguished between two 
types of models that are generally used to explain and interpret the behaviour of 
politicians. Opportunistic models argue that policy is determined by electoral 
motivations: Politicians just follow policies which maximise their probability of winning 
the next elections. Political cycles depending on these policies typically show higher 
deficits in election years or shortly before because government allocates bonuses to the 
electorate in order to gain popularity right before the elections. Mink and De Haan (2005) 
find that during election years deficits tend to be higher, whereas in the year preceding 
the elections they are not. On the other hand, Andrikopoulos, et al. (2004) considers 
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larger time period and find that right-wing governments tend to be in favour of fiscal 
stabilisation during election times. Alesina and Roubini (1997) find no significantly 
higher deficits for left-wing governments as compared to other governments. 
The above literature review suggests that it would be interesting to investigate the 
economic, political and institutional factors that are source of budget deficit instability in 
selected Asian countries persistently facing high fiscal deficits. 
 
3.  OVERVIEW OF FISCAL DEFICIT IN SAMPLE  
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
The resources available for fiscal policy is limited for South Asian countries in 
particular and developing countries in general and there is political pressure for specific 
public expenditures that is difficult to oppose. These issues hold for developing countries 
and most of these apply to the case of South Asian countries [Jha (2009)]. India has 
registered an increase in their revenue expenditure ratio overtime whereas Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have shown a decline in this ratio. The public expenditure to 
GDP ratio has risen in India during 1995 to 2009 but has fallen in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
So public deficit in South Asian countries remains high for Pakistan and Sri Lanka and 
countries face considerable resource constraints on financing of the deficit that result 
from their expenditure in excess of revenues.  
The efficiency of public expenditure can be haul out through transparency, 
accountability and corruption in the public sector on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high) [World 
development Indicators (2010)]. India is the best performer among South Asian countries 
but has shown no progress in its performance between 2005 and 2008. Bangladesh’s 
score enhanced after 2006 but remained stagnant thereafter. Pakistan’s performance has 
been the worse among the South Asian nations, however Sri Lanka’s performance was 
comparable to India’s in 2005 and 2006 but then worsen. 
Malaysia faced persistent fiscal deficits in the decade of 2000s, averaging just 
above 5 percent of GDP from 2000-05. By 2007, the fiscal deficit had fallen below 4 
percent, but with the commencement of the financial crisis, the decline in growth and the 
consequent fiscal stimulus measures, the deficit raised to 7.1 percent of GDP in 2009 
and 5.8 percent in 2010.The Indonesian government pursued an expansionary fiscal 
policy to sustain domestic demand during the global downturn. Improvement in 
Indonesia's macroeconomic fundamentals and political stability are creating a centre of 
attention for foreign investors. Tax revenues are anticipated to increase in 2010 on more 
concentrated collection efforts. All this is expected to be sufficient to finance the fiscal 
deficit, but there is a need to reform the subsidy structure and efficiency of commodity 
revenues in Indonesia to attain long term fiscal sustainability [World Development 
Indicators (2010)].  In general governments in ASEAN countries over the time assumed a 
simulative role however fiscal prudence continue to be maintained for fiscal deficit to be 
at the manageable level. 
In short, low tax/GDP ratios and inelastic expenditure/GDP ratios in south 
Asia and ASEAN countries leads to structurally unshakable fiscal deficits.  
Furthermore, quality of institution that creates economic stability and a move 
towards democratic regimes is also essential for the stability of fiscal deficit in South 
Asian Region. 
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The decade wise average deficit to GDP ratio across countries. In Malaysia deficit 
to GDP ratio was averaged on 5.6 during 1981–1990, 4 percent during 1991–2000 and it 
was average 5 percent during 2001–2010. In Indonesia deficit to GDP ratio was averaged 
on 1.1 during 1981–1990, 6 percent during 1991-2000 and it was average 2.1 percent 
during 2001-2010. 
In Thailand deficit to GDP ratio was averaged on 1.13 percent during 1981-1990, 
2.38 percent during 1991-2000 and it was average 3.66 percent during 2001-2010. In 
Philippines deficit to GDP ratio was averaged on 2 percent during 1981-1990, 5 percent 
during 1991-2000 and it was average 2 percent during 2001-2010. The fiscal balance of 
the region’s four ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) are 
projected to remain in the range of –1.2 percent to –2.4 percent of GDP in 2011-15 
[Southeast Asian Economic Outlook (2010)]. In china deficit to GDP ratio was averaged 
on 0.017 during 1981-1990, 0.008 during 1991-2000 and it was average 0.007 during 
2001-2010. 
In Pakistan deficit to GDP ratio was averaged on 7 percent during 1981-1990, 
5 percent during 1991-2000 and it was average 4 percent during 2001-2010. In India 
deficit to GDP ratio was averaged on 8 percent during 1981-1990, 5 percent during 
1991-2000 and it was average 0.04 during 2001-2010. In Sri Lanka deficit to GDP 
ratio was averaged on 0.09 during 1981-1990, 8 percent during 1991-2000 and it was 
average 8 percent during 2001-2010.  
 
4.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The investigation of the sources of budget deficit volatility is used based on the 
theoretical insights of Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Person and Tabellini (1997) and 
empirical work of Woo (2003) and Henisz (2004) build around the role of institutions on 
the economic activity. The present study focuses on the economic, political and 
institutional determinants of budget deficit volatility. The rolling standard deviation for 
three years of budget deficit to GDP is used to measure volatility and dynamic panel data 
models are estimated for the period 1984 to 2010 for major South Asian and AESIAN 
countries. The empirical specification is dynamic panel data models to take account of 
persistence in the volatility behaviour and identify the factors determining the volatility 
of budget deficit is given below: 
itiitititititit vCINSTECONBDVBDV i  1     … (1) 
itiititititit vCINSTECONBDVBDV  1  
Where BDV is logarithm of volatility of budget deficit for the country i for the period t, 
ECONit is set of macroeconomic variables, INSTit is set of political and institutional 
variables, Cit is set of control variables to capture country specific characteristics. 
The vector of economic variables measures the structural characteristics of 
countries include budget deficit as percentage of GDP, real per capita GDP, inflation 
and openness. The higher budget deficit causes more frequent changes in government 
spending and taxation, therefore, it is expected that level of budget deficit is 
positively associated with budget deficit instability. Low income countries have 
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inefficient tax and spending system and they are more prone to budget deficit and in 
addition they are more expose to socio-political conflicts [Roubini (1991)]. The real 
GDP per capita is included to capture the difference in the level of economic 
development between the countries and relationship with budget deficit volatility is 
mixed. There is evidence that supports a negative relationship and reason is that the 
low income countries have shorter and more volatile business cycles due to less 
developed financial markets and weak economic institutions [Fatas and Mohov 
(2006)] and these countries often opt discretionary fiscal policy [Rand and Tarp 
(2002)]. However, Woo (2003) come up with a positive relationship between per 
capita GDP and budget deficit arguing that a growing economies have more 
resources and may be in a better position to solve socio-economic distributional 
problems which may help to deal budget deficits and consequently more volatile 
budget deficit.  The inflation is included to take account of the level of economic 
uncertainty. As uncertainty causes volatility in government expenditures and revenue 
which further affects the volatility of budget deficit. The inflation effects budget 
deficit also through higher nominal interest payments. Therefore, it is expected that 
higher inflation leads to more budget deficit instability. The external shocks are 
captured by the degree of openness measured as natural logarithm of the ratio of 
exports plus imports ratio to GDP. It is expected that degree of openness positively 
contribute to the budget deficit volatility of the country. The population growth is 
used as control variable and it is expected that it is negatively associated to budget 
deficit volatility. Large population leads to spread the cost of financing government 
spending over a large pool of tax payers giving the benefits of increasing return to 
scale and consequently providing the goods and services in more stable fashion and 
resultantly less volatility in budget deficits. 
The vector of variables that capture political instability and quality of government 
institutions are political stability which include: law and order, military in politics, 
corruption, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality, internal, external, ethnic and 
religious conflicts  socioeconomic conditions. The variables incorporated in the model 
are Institutions include: law and order (strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
popular observance of law), the bureaucratic quality (the bureaucracy has expertise and 
strength to govern without drastic changes in policy and interruption in the government 
services) and investment profile (factors effecting investment risk (contract viability, 
profit repatriation and payment delays); democracy include: democracy accountability 
and military in politics (the involvement of military in politics even at peripheral level is 
a diminution of democratic accountability) and government stability (government unity, 
legislative strength and popular support);  social and economic conditions include 
components that constraint the government actions and fuel social dissatisfaction; conflict 
include: internal conflict, external conflict and ethnic and religious tensions. 
The dynamic panel specification given in model (1) contains fixed country specific 
effects and lag dependent variable is correlated with error term. To deal with country 
specific fixed effects and endogeneity, Arellono and Bond (1991) suggests applying the 
Generalised Method of Moments after first differencing the equation. The first difference 
remove the country specific effects and instruments set includes the levels and lags of 
dependent and exogenous variables. In difference-GMM estimates lag variables are weak 
instruments [Blundell and Bond (1998)], therefore efficiency can be increased by adding 
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the original equation in the level to the system, if the first difference of the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with original effects. Lagged dependent and exogenous 
variables can be used as instrument variables.  
 
Data and Sample 
The study used annual data on economic, political and institutional variables, from 
1984 to 2010. The existence of missing values for different variables reduces the number 
of countries to four in South Asian region and five in ASEAN Region. The source of 
economic data is international financial statistics and world development Indicators. 
Political and institutional variables are obtained from International Country Risk Data 
Guide (ICRG).  
Economic variables revealing structural distinctiveness of the countries 
include, budget deficit to GDP, real GDP per capita, inflation, openness. The reason 
for taking log of budget deficit to GDP ratio is to explore the direction of relationship 
between level of deficit and deficit volatility and for income is to allow for variation 
in economic development among countries. Likewise, inflation is taken to test the 
hypothesis that whether the higher level of inflation is associated with higher level of 
budget deficit volatility and openness calculated as ratio of national trade to GDP is 
taken to explore the effect of external shocks on budget deficit volatility. 
Furthermore a demographic variable i.e., population growth is taken to control for 
country size effects. 
To explore the effect of political instability on budget deficit volatility, the study 
uses political instability index constructed in ICRG by assigning risk points to political 
risk components which include government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, law 
and order, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality, religion and ethnic tensions. 
The minimum number of points that can be given to every constituent is zero and the 
maximum number depends on the fixed weight that component is given in overall risk 
assessment, lower the risk point higher the total risk and higher the risk point lower the 
total risk.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The determinates of budget deficit volatility are estimated applying the dynamic 
panel model and Generalised method of Moments of Blundell and Bond (1998) is used as 
estimation technique that allows to deal with country specific effects and any edogeneity 
that may be due to the correlation of the country specific effects and dependent variable. 
The analysis begins by estimating the macroeconomic determinants of budget 
deficit volatility; population growth is used as control variable to take account of country 
specific effects. The set of macroeconomic determinants include real GDP per capita, 
deficit to GDP ratio and inflation. Lag of budget deficit volatility is used to assess the 
existence of inertia in the budgetary process. Thereafter political and institutional 
variables are included in the model, as political stability is important determinants of 
fiscal deficit stability. It is expected that political uncertainty is source of constraining 
and damaging economic activity and decrease GDP growth which in turn affects budget 
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deficit instability. The political instability is a multidimensional phenomenon and cannot 
be captured by a single variable [Woo (2003)]. It suggests that there other factors like 
better law and order situation and socioeconomic conditions, less corruption, less 
involvement of military in government and better quality of bureaucracy, more 
government stability and above all less conflicts.  In addition to political stability 
component sub components are also included in the budget deficit volatility model. In the 
present study the determinants of budgets deficits are estimated for two regions, South 
Asia and ASEAN countries for the period 1984 to 2010, to capture the difference in 
structural characteristics in these two regions Four countries are selected for South Asia 
and five countries for the ASEAN region. 
The results of the basic specification of model are reported in model 1 of Table 2. 
The results indicate that budget deficit volatility persistence and it is highly significant. It 
is well documented behaviour of the fiscal policy that it has inertia. This result is also 
justified by the fact that changes in government revenue tend to lead changes in 
expenditures, however spending increase are easier to accommodate than spending 
reduction and resultantly in the context of revenue volatility, there is bias in favour of 
deficit which in turn generate budget deficit volatility. Fatas and Mhov (2010) argue that 
increase in spending is hard to reverse and politically difficult and institutional 
environment has association with this persistence. Agnello and Sausa (2009) also confirm 
the persistence in the budgetary process. The results show that real GDP per capita and 
inflation has a positive and significant effect on the budget deficit volatility. The real 
GDP per capita captures the degree of economic development during the sample period. 
The positive relationship of income with the budget deficit volatility suggests that the 
countries with high per capita income have more instability in budget deficits and this 
result is confirmed by Fatas and Mihov (2006, 2010) and Woo (2003). Fatas and Mihov 
(2010) have pointed out fiscal policy is not conducted by benevolent government trying 
to maximise social welfare function and fiscal policy is too volatile. Therefore due to bad 
fiscal management and lack of internalising the spending decisions leads to growing 
deficits and accumulation of debt. Woo (2003) supports positive relationship indicating 
that growing economies have more resources and they may be in a better position to deal 
with the fiscal deficit problem. The results show that the budget deficit volatility 
decreases as the as population growth increases. The higher the population growth more 
stable becomes budget deficit as large population allows the benefits of increasing return 
to scale, hence enabling the government to provide the public goods in less volatile way 
as it leads to spread the cost of financing government spending over a large pool of tax 
payers. The results reported for model 2 Table 2 show that the budget deficit volatility 
increases as the degree of openness increases and exposure of more external shocks make 
the budget deficit more volatile. External shocks can be source of fiscal instability 
especially in developing countries. Changes in export and import prices can affect public 
sector balance either through profits of exporting or through import tariffs and taxes on 
exports. The growth of terms of trade is expected to be associated with similar budget 
deficits and to have a greater impact in economies that are more open to trade. Large and 
volatile external shocks can decline economic activity which in turn affects the deficits. 
Agnello and Sausa (2009) and Fatas and Mahov (2010) also show that degree of 
openness is positively associated with budget deficit volatility and spending volatility 
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respectively. The other economic variables have the same relationship as in the closed 
economy specification given in model1. 
When the political and institutional variables are included to broaden the 
analysis the role of economic variables remain unchanged as shown by the results 
presented in models 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Table 2. This ensures the results obtained latter 
by including the institutional and political variables do not capture the residual of the 
other economic variables during the sample period. Fatas and Mihov (2010), 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991), Roubini (1991), Abgello and Sousa (2009) and 
Alisena, et al. (2003) have come up with same conclusions. Political economic 
theory argues that fiscal policy depends on political and institutional environment 
[Alesina and Perotti (1995)] and empirical evidence show that government that face 
more political instability and bad governance are less likely use discretionary fiscal 
policy and possible cost of restrictions are lack of flexibility to deal with economic 
fluctuations  Institutions and political variables does matter for fiscal policy and have 
a significant impact on fiscal outcome such as budget deficit when the institutional 
environment provide the desired discipline to restrict fiscal policy and improve 
macroeconomic performance  [Woo (2003), Alesina and Parotti (1996), Fatas and 
Mihov (2003)]. The governments, where political system is such that role of military 
in politics is high, bureaucratic quality is low and stability conditions are not good, 
may face constraints in implementing the fiscal policies. This reduces the 
government ability to respond to economic shocks in timely manner and effect is 
instability in the budget deficit. The result reported for model 3 shows that political 
instability is significantly associated with budget deficit instability. The law and 
order situation and bureaucratic quality creates a situation that fiscal authorities 
cannot adjust promptly to the changes in economic conditions and that indirectly 
cause budget deficit instability [Fatas and Mihov (2010)].  This type of non-
adjustment may show up with volatility, procyclical or that the other extreme 
countercyclical fiscal policy. Lane (2003) and Heinisz (2000) show that political 
constraints affect the cylicity of fiscal policy and Agnello and Sousa (2009) 
document that high level of political instability and less democracy is associated with 
higher budget deficit volatility. Agnello and Sousa (2009) find that a high level of 
political stability and lower level of democracy is associated with higher level of 




 Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Budget Deficit Volatility 9.38 2.59 16.78 4.14 
Budget Deficit to GDP –0.11 0.52 0.75 -5.84 
Inflation 5.93 3.60 18.63 0.29 
Political Stability 4.65 1.00 6.9 2.38 
Real Per Capita GDP 5.59 0.87 7.00 2.99 
Population Growth 2.63 1.73 7.95 -1.94 
Openness 0.00 2.00 16.37 -5.99 
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Table 2 
Evidence of the Determinants of Budget Deficit Volatility 

































































































































Political Stability   –0.26* 
(–2.91) 
     
Democracy    –0.65* 
(–3.36) 
    
 Low Level of 
Corruption 
    –0.30* 
(–2.67) 
   





      –0.31* 
(–5.11) 
 




 0.65 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.67 
Hansan  (p-value) 0.41 0.28 0.35 0.54 0.44 0.32 0.29 0.60 
Note: *indicates significant at 1 percent, **indicates significant at 5 percent, and ***indicates significant at 10 
percent. The error terms are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted. 
 
The political and institutional variables are significantly related to budget deficit 
volatility with expected signs as shown by the results reported in Table 2. The results 
indicate that high level of political stability is associated with more budget stability. 
Higher corruption and low institutional quality (legal and bureaucracy) and conflicts 
(internal, external, ethnic and religious) lead to more fluctuations in the budget deficit. 
Improvement in social and economic condition and high level of democracy cause 
reduction in the budget deficit volatility. Alesina and Tabellini (2008) suggest that most 
of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries can be explained by high 
levels of corruption. The difference between two regions is captured by including a 
dummy which take value 1 for ASEAN counties and zero for South Asian countries and 
results indicate a significant difference with expected negative sign for most of the 
models indicating that the ASEAN countries have less budget deficit instability. These 
results are supported by the findings of other studies; Fatas and Mihov (2003) conclude 
that political constraints are significant determinants of government spending variability 
when institutional variables and economic controls are included.  Woo (2003) emphasises 
the role of political factors (government fragmentation, political instability and 
institutions), social polarisation (ethnic division and income inequality), and institutional 
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factors (budgetary procedures and rules, bureaucratic, efficiency, and democracy) on 
budget deficit. He identifies that high level of social and political unrest might be strong 
expression of dissatisfaction with the current government and its politics and more likely 
to be shorten the tenure of politicians and government is more likely to engage in short 
term polices at the expense of macroeconomic stability 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In the present study the economic, political and institutional sources of budgets 
deficits are estimated for two regions South Asia and ASEAN countries for the period 
1984 to 2010. Four countries are selected for South Asia and five countries for the 
ASEAN region. The determinates of budget deficit volatility are estimated applying the 
dynamic panel model and generalised method of moments of Blundell and Bond (1998) 
that allows to deal with country specific effects and any edogeneity that may be due to 
the correlation of the country specific effects and dependent variable. 
The analysis begins by estimating the macroeconomic determinants of budget 
deficit volatility. The results reveal high income, high inflation rate and large budget to 
GDP ratio are associated with large budget instability. The small countries with low 
population growth have more volatile budget deficits. Lag of budget deficit volatility is 
positive and significant indicating that the budget deficit volatility has a persistent effect 
and this result is consistent with the inertia of the budgetary process. High corruption, 
low institutional quality (legal and bureaucracy) and conflicts (internal, external, ethnic 
and religious) cause more fluctuations in the budget deficit. The high level of democracy 
and better social and economic condition reduces the budget deficit volatility. The results 
indicate that the ASEAN countries have less budget deficit instability. The results of the 
current study leads to important implication for government that by improving the quality 
of institutions, creating situations for economic stability and moving towards democratic 
regimes would ensure more stable fiscal deficits and resultantly positive effect on the 
long term economic growth. 
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